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Abstract—Mobile edge computing (MEC) is an emerging technology to transform the cloud-based computing services into the
edge-based ones. Autonomous vehicular network (AVNET), as one of the most promising applications of MEC, can feature edge
learning and communication techniques, improving the safety for autonomous vehicles (AVs). This paper focuses on the edge learning
in AVNET, where AVs at the edge of the network share model parameters instead of data in a distributed manner, and an aggregator
(e.g., a base station) aggregates parameters from AVs and at the end obtains a trained model. Despite promising, security issues, such
as data leakage, computing integrity invasion and fault connection in existing edge learning cases are not considered fully. To the best
of our knowledge, there lacks an effective scheme simultaneously covering the foregoing security issues. Therefore, we propose
SecEL, a privacy-preserving, verifiable and fault-tolerant scheme for edge learning in AVNET. First, we leverage the primitive of
bivariate polynomial-based secret sharing to encrypt model parameters by one-time padding. Second, we use homomorphic
authenticator based on message authentication code to support verifiable computation. Third, we mitigate the computation failure
problem caused by fault connection. Last, we simulate and evaluate SecEL in terms of time cost, throughput and classification
accuracy. The experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness of SecEL.
Index Terms—Edge learning, Autonomous vehicles, Privacy, Verification, Fault connection
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, mobile edge computing (MEC) is regardedas a promising way to perform computation-consuming
tasks by enabling both local processing and global coordina-
tion [1], [2], [3]. Autonomous vehicular network (AVNET)
becomes one of the popular applications of MEC, facilitating
smart city development [4], [5]. In particular, MEC nodes,
such as smartphones or autonomous vehicles (AVs)’ central
controllers at the edge of the network, are allowed to
provide sufficient computation resources and locally tackle
computing tasks, and meanwhile, a server at an edge
node (e.g., a base station) is responsible for global coordina-
tion [3]. These MEC nodes have powerful central processing
units (CPUs) or graphics processing units (GPUs) and
usually are close to vehicles, resulting in short response time
and low transmission latency. Therefore, more and more
advanced technologies have been integrated into MEC.
Edge learning [3], [6] in AVNET is one of the advanced
technologies of MEC, where AVs are able to collaboratively
learn a high-accuracy machine learning model used to pre-
dict the road environment to improve vehicle safety. This
collaboration paradigm enables an individual AV to obtain
an accuracy-acceptable model, although the individual AV
owns limited sensing data at local. A practical case of edge
learning in AVNET is the Tesla’s machine learning model
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for auto-driving feeded with data from millions of Tesla
vehicles [6]. Following the popular network architecture for
MEC [7], in edge learning, there are multiple AVs being
collaborative learners and a remote server being a parameter
server. Autonomous vehicles share model parameters which
are trained on the local sensing data. The server keeps a
common machine learning model to train, by aggregating
shared model parameters from multiple AVs and updating
model parameters. Individual AVs continually train on the
same local sensing data using the updated parameters until
the pre-defined loss threshold is reached.
Problem Statement: Efforts have been taken to improve
the performance of edge learning [3], [6], [8], [9]. However,
the privacy and security issues of edge learning may be not
well-addressed: (i) Sharing model parameters (instead of
data) cannot protect data privacy due to the popular mem-
bership inference attacks [10] and reconstruct attacks [11]
on the sharing model parameters. These attacks can infer
the specific vehicle-behaviour information implied in the
local sensing data which natively causes privacy concern.
Recently, data privacy issue has attracted people’s great at-
tention, and international organization has announced data
protection standard, such as GDPR [12]. Existing solutions
employ traditional public key-based encryption to ensure
privacy-preserving federated learning [13], [14], but they do
not consider the features of the MEC setting, e.g., resource-
limited, bandwidth-hungry and dynamic AVNET. Thus, a
lightweight privacy-preserving scheme applied into edge
learning is in need. (ii) The aggregator at the remote server
can be subject to various attacks on computing integrity [15],
[16] leading to a manipulated model misbehaving (refer
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2it to Section 3.2). It would disrupt the model accuracy
and even poison AVs’ sensing capability. Existing privacy-
preserving federated learning methods [13], [17] protect
data privacy but neglect data integrity. Therefore, providing
computing verification in a privacy-preserving scheme is
inevitable for edge learning. In addition, considering the
lightweight requirement in AVNET, the proposed scheme
should enforce efficiency in the meantime. (iii) Communica-
tion failure between MEC nodes and the remote server may
happen and cause computation failure, since AVs usually
have high mobility. Concretely, some AV may lose its secret,
making itself unable to obtain the returned learning result
from the aggregator. Here, computation failure can decrease
the learning performance of this AV, which may cause the
unexpected safety threats, which belongs to non-malicious
failure mentioned in [18]. From this view, a proposed secu-
rity scheme should particularly tolerate the fault connection
problem.
In addition, we concretely focus on the Software-Defined
Networking (SDN)-enabled network architecture for MEC,
since it is recently standardized by 3GPP [19] which pro-
motes edge learning. SDN is widely adopted and enables
the capability of resources management. An SDN-enabled
server assembling SDN control modules can select the most
suitable technology to ensure maximum-degree reliability
of connection. Most importantly, the SDN-enabled server
can have a network-wide view of the connection state of
communicating AVs [20], [21], meaning that it can be aware
of the event of fault connection, which is crucial for the
proposed scheme.
Our Contribution: To simultaneously overcome
the aforementioned challenges, we propose a privacy-
preserving, verifiable and fault-tolerant scheme for edge
learning in AVNET, where AVs asynchronously share local
model parameters to an SDN-enabled server in charge of
aggregation. The contributions are summarized as follows:
• We leverage the primitive of bivariate polynomial-
based secret sharing and utilize the one-time
padding method instead of asymmetric encryption
to guarantee the secrecy of shared model parame-
ters, which leads to a lightweight privacy-preserving
scheme.
• We seamlessly integrate the homomorphic authenti-
cator technique into the proposed privacy-preserving
scheme, which allows participating AVs to verify the
computation results from the SDN-enabled server,
avoiding getting manipulated results.
• We enable SecEL to tolerate disconnected AVs,
thereby improving the reliability of learning. Par-
ticularly, an honest but disconnected autonomous
vehicle’s secret can be recovered by a group of
alive participants so that he can fluently obtain the
computation results from the SDN-enabled server.
Considering the rare bandwidth resources, there is
no need to introduce the additional interaction to
share secrets among the group of alive participants.
• We lastly simulate SecEL in Python-based setting and
evaluate its performance when it is applied into a
popular model-learning case. The evaluation results
demonstrate the effectiveness of SecEL in terms of
time cost, throughput and learning accuracy.
Roadmap: The rest of our paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the primitives in-
volved in our paper, including federate learning, bivariate
polynomial-based secret sharing and homomorphic authen-
ticator. In addition, we also give a typical scenario of edge
learning in AVNET. In Section 3, we present the security
model of SecEL. Subsequently, we show the detailed design
of SecEL over five phases in Section 4. Afterwards, in
Section 5, we give a security analysis of the proposed SecEL
with respect to the security model. We lastly demonstrate
the performance results by evaluating SecEL in Section 6,
survey the related work in Section 7 and make a conclusion
in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the essential algorithm of feder-
ated learning. Afterwards, we introduce two applied cryp-
tographic tools.
2.1 Federated Learning
Federated learning is a kind of distributed machine learning
algorithm, where multiple machines and a central sever
jointly solve the learning problem using distributed gradient
descent techniques [7]. The learning problem is to obtain the
optimized parameters by minimizing the loss function on
training dataset.
Formally, let vector D and w represent training dataset
and training parameters of the model, respectively. Then,
L(w,D) defines the loss function on D. Therefore, when
federated learning is adapted, Li(wi,Di) denotes the i-
th machine’s loss function, where Di is maintained locally
by the machine, and L(w,D) presents the loss function at
a central server. Suppose N machines exist and then the
following formula will be hold:
L(w,D) =
∑N
i=1 Li(wi,Di)
N
.
To minimize L(w,D), stochastic gradient descent
method (SGD) is often used to find
w∗ = arg min L(w,D).
Distributed SGD can be naturally derived from SGD. It
includes two major learning steps to achieve the learning
problem, such as local update and global aggregation. In local
update, each machine preforms the machine learning task
locally and trains a small-scale model. In global aggregation,
a central server collects the small-scale models together and
updates parameters.
Concretely, it works as follows : (i) Each machine i
initializes the local model parameters witi with the same
randomized value, where it = 0. (ii) The step of local update
is executed to update witi by iteration via the following rule,
wit+1i = w
it
i − η∇Li(witi ,Di),
where η is the learning rate. (iii) After one or multiple local
updates, the step of global aggregation is performed by
aggregating all machines’ parameters (a.k.a. intermediate
gradients) uploaded by the participating machines. Herein,
3we let the frequency of local update be 15, as it is recom-
mended to be in range [10, 20] [22]. That is,
wit+16 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
wit+15i .
After finishing the global aggregation step, wit+16 is broad-
casted to the joining machines and they continue the local
update step. (iv) This learning process is repeated until
the loss function at the cental server is minimized to the
predefined threshold. Note that wit+15i should be encrypted
by the individual participant before sharing, since they may
expose the private information of the local sensing data by
leveraging inference or reconstruct techniques [10], [11].
On the other hand, distributed SGD generally is clas-
sified into two categories: synchronous SGD and asyn-
chronous SGD, depending on whether the process of up-
loading local parameters is synchronized. Consider the
features of AVNET environment including bandwidth-
limitation and latency-sensitivity, this paper employs
weakly asynchronous SGD [23] which neutralizes the effect
of synchronous and asynchronous SGD. Particularly, it lets
the central server wait for s (1 ≤ s ≤ N ) number of
participating machines who finish uploading their param-
eters, rather than all machines as synchronous SGD does.
Meanwhile, it also avoids the problem of stale gradients
caused by asynchronous SGD.
2.2 Bivariate Polynomial-based Secret Sharing
Derived from Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, bivariate
polynomial-based secret sharing uses a bivariate polyno-
mial to share secret instead of using a univariate one [24].
Suppose that a secret is hidden in the constant term of a
bivariate polynomial. The secret owner can distribute two
polynomials related the secret to a participant, rather than a
point. Thus, it distributes more information to participants
than the univariate polynomial-based secret sharing does.
Due to the additional information, a participant’s lost secret
is allowed to be rebuilt by other participants. In addition,
each pair of AVs naturally share a common private key,
which enables them to privately transmit messages.
Formally, a bivariate polynomial can be defined as
F(x, y) =
∑t−1
i=0
∑t−1
j=0 ai,jx
iyj mod p, where p is a prime
larger than the secret which is hid in F(0, 0). Herein, the
degree in both variate x and y is t − 1. Our scheme uses
a symmetric bivariate polynomial, in which coefficients
ai,j = aj,i, which allows F(x, y) to have a same threshold in
variate x and y to recover the secret F(0, 0). In the contrary,
in an ansymmetric bivariate polynomial, ai,j is not equal to
aj,i, so F(x, y) does not exactly have threshold t.
2.3 Homomorphic Authenticator
Basically, homomorphic authenticator is used to indicate
which input data is authenticated and how the input data
should be correctly computed [25], [26]. A general homo-
morphic authenticator scheme includes a sequence of the
following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.
KeyGen(1λ) → (λ). With a security parameter λ, it
outputs authenticated key s and public parameter pp.
eNB
RSU/
Wi-Fi AP
RSU/
Wi-Fi AP
V2I link AV movement
Link deterioration
V2V link
𝐴𝑉௞
𝐴𝑉௞
Updated model
Fig. 1: Scenario model
Auth(s,m, τ) → (σ). Taking the authenticated key s, a
message m and a label τ ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, it generates an
authenticated tag σ for m under τ .
Eval(pp, f , σ)→ σ∗. Given pp, a vector of authenti-
cated tags σ = (σ1, ..., σn) and an arithmetic computa-
tion (it could be an arithmetic circuit), it outputs a new
authenticated tag σ∗. If σi is the authenticated tag for
mi (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) as the output of some label program
P (to be introduced), then σ∗ authenticates m∗, where
m∗ = f(m1, ...,mn), as the output of the composed pro-
gram P ∗ = f(P1, ..., Pn).
Verf(s,m∗, P, σ∗) → {true, false}. It is a deterministic
algorithm to verify whether σ∗ authenticates m∗ by the
labeled program P .
Evaluation correctness of the above scheme is indicated as
follows. If P ∗ = f(P1, .., Pn), m∗ = f(m1, ...,mn), and
σ∗ ← Eval(pp, P ∗), then true← Verf(s,m∗, P ∗, σ∗).
Remark. Label τ and labeled program P are the essential
components for homomorphic authenticator. They define
which data is authenticated and how data is evaluated,
respectively. Hence, SecEL uses the round index to label
the shared parameters and the labeled program is the sum
operation on the shared parameters from participants. A
labeled program is represented as P = (f, τ1, ..., τn). The
composed program is generated by P ∗ = f(P1, ..., Pn),
where the inputs of P ∗ correspondingly are the different
labeled inputs of P1, ..., Pn.
3 SCENARIO MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we firstly introduce the edge learning sce-
nario in AVNET. Then, we discuss the basic assumptions
around the security threats in the network scenario. Further,
we present the security goals with respect to the threats.
43.1 Scenario Model
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the edge learning scenario
in AVNET [7], where AVs collaborate to learn the vehicle
environment for autonomous navigation with the help of
edge nodes. Through edge learning, AVs can indirectly share
sensing data to improve the prediction accuracy, i.e., the
sharing model parameters which are trained on the local
sensing data. Specifically, edge nodes can be various base
stations (BSs), including eNBs and RSUs/Wi-Fi APs. AVs
can connect with the closest BS via different communication
technologies, such as dedicated short range communications
(DSRC) and White-Fi. V2I (vehicle to infrastructure) link
presents the connection between AVs and BSs. V2V (vehicle
to vehicle) link means the connection among vehicles.
Suppose that each AV has the small-scale sensing data
due to the constrained sensing ability and fails to gain a
high-accuracy prediction model. Therefore, each AV can
locally train a small-scale model on the local sensing data.
After training, AVs send intermediate gradients to an edge
node (e.g., an eNB) that keeps and updates a common
training model. Then, AVs obtain the latest updated
parameters from the edge node to update their local
models. The foregoing process repeats until the training
loss is small enough. For ease of presentation, it is defined
that those AVs and the edge node are in a collaborative
group, and they are participants. Respectively, the entities
outside the group are outsiders.
Recall that we focus on the SDN-enabled MEC which
is capable of resources management. In this scenario, SDN
control modules in edge nodes can help allocate network
resources flexibly and efficiently for V2I link according to
different requirements of communication qualities. Note
that an edge node’s SDN control module maintains the
global view of V2I and V2V links in its communication
range. Hence, the edge node can be aware of the link
deterioration of AVs, if this AV moves out of the range of
the connected AVs, like vehicle AVk in Fig. 1. Further, it is
not difficult for BSs to identify which ciphertexts are from
which AVs as shown in Section 4.
3.2 Basic Assumptions
First, we assume that AVs are honest but curious, which
means individual AVs can honestly participate in a collabo-
rative learning but want to know more private information
of other AVs like intermediate gradients. That is because
that there exists membership inference attacks [10] and
reconstruct attacks [11]. If AVs’ intermediate gradients are
exposed, they can be exploited to infer secret information of
the corresponding local data.
Second, we assume that there exist fault AVs in the
scenario. Fault AVs are those whose connections are invalid
and they cannot response to other AVs inside a group. This
is reasonable since AVs may offline due to various reasons.
Third, we assume that the edge node can be malicious,
where he may manipulate or substitute the intermediate
gradients collected from AVs and return incorrect updated
parameters. In this case, malicious attacks can be launched,
such as trojaning attacks [15]. Particularly, the adversarial
edge node can inject trojaning parameters to the original
TABLE 1: Summary of notations
Notation Description
round the version number of parameters on the BS
AVi the AV with identifier i
N integer, the number of AVs participating in a round (N
varies in different rounds)
[N ] the N -length set that is {1, ..., N}
(the similar meanings for [M ], [U ], [T ])
T the size of [T ] (the similar meanings for M,U )
i ∈ [N ] the unique identifier of each AV
t f + 1 ≤ t ≤ N , the threshold to reconstruct the secret
Fi(0, 0) also refer to as Vi(0), a masking secret of AVi
s an authenticated key
si a partially authenticated key of AV i and is a part of s
Zp {1, 2, ..., p−1}, p is a secure prime larger than the secret
model, through which the manipulated model would mis-
behave in a specific case. To notice, prior work on the
security of machine learning [17] makes an assumption
that the parameter server in their scheme (like the role of
the edge node in this paper) is honest. On the contrary,
we consider the worst case of our design, which is more
realistic.
Last, we assume that there exist authenticated communi-
cation channels between entities (e.g. AVs, BSs). Specifically,
a symmetric authenticated encryption algorithm [27] can be
used to securely transmit data between any two parties who
share a common secret key, in advance (to be explained in
the Setup phase of Section 4).
3.3 Security Goals
In this section, we claim our security goals of SecEL.
We will discuss the security issues, taking the features
of AVNET into consideration, such as resource limitation,
asynchronous communication and AVs’ high mobility.
First of all, SecEL protects each AV’s data privacy against
other participants and outsiders. Specifically, individual
AVs’ model parameters cannot be leaked to anyone but
itself. Only a threshold number of AVs can obtain the
aggregated parameters.
Second, SecEL ensures the authenticity and correctness
of computation at the aggregators or edge nodes. It is note-
worthy that in this resource-limited setting, the proposed
verification method should be efficient.
Third, SecEL can tolerate the link-failed AVs and enforce
the computation reliability. Concretely, due to the high
mobility of AVs and asynchronous communication, some
AV can leave the communication range of other AVs and
lose the secret shares (rather than the secret) which are
given by other AVs in Setup phase (refer it to Section 4).
This makes the AV fail to decrypt parameters returned by
the aggregator, which may block his training process. Thus,
SecEL guarantees that the AV’s secret share can be recovered
by other participants. For the sake of efficiency, this recovery
process should not introduce the additional secret sharing
round.
4 SECEL DESIGN
As Fig. 2 shown, an overview of SecEL in one round which
contains five phases, including Setup, Masking, Aggrega-
tion, Verification, Decryption. A round here refers to a
5Fig. 2: Overview of SecEL. Herein, the number of active AVs
in different phases (i.e., [T ], [M ], [U ]) and their relationships
are discussed in Fig. 3.
period when AVs share their intermediate gradients with
the edge node and obtain aggregated parameters computed
by the edge node. Below we elaborate all the phases. To
notice, we summarize the notations in Table 1 for ease of
description. At last, we provide an alternative design to
avoid running repeatedly the Setup phase in each round
for sharing fresh secrets.
4.1 Core Design
This section presents the concrete design for five phases.
Setup Phase. In this step, each AV selects a masking
secret as well as a partially authenticated key, and shares
them with other counterparts.
• Masking secret. AVi hides the masking secret in
Fi(x, y) when x = 0, y = 0, where Fi(x, y) ∈ Zp[x, y]
with degree t − 1 in variate x and y is a privately
chosen symmetric bivariate polynomial.
• Authenticated key. AVi randomly selects key si ∈ Zp
which is called as partially authenticated key.
Afterwards, AVi distributes shares {Fi(x, j), Fi(j, y)} of
Fi(0, 0) and key si to AVj (j 6= i & j ∈ [N ]). For each AV,
no less than t ≤ T ≤ N other AVs are assumed receiving
his secret shares.
According to the properties of symmetric bivariate poly-
nomial, we have the following insights:
◦ F(0, 0) =∑Ni=1 Fi(0, 0);
◦ t number of Fi(0, j) or Fi(j, 0) are sufficient to recon-
struct Fi(0, 0);
◦ If any Fi(0, j) owned by AVj is lost, it can be recovered
by t number of Fi(q, j) (q ∈ [T ]); the similar case for Fi(j, 0)
holds.
◦ AVi and AVj share a common secret key with respect
to Fi(x, y) (or Fj(x, y)), since Fi(i, y) owned by AVi at y = j
equals to Fi(j, y) owned by AVj at y = i.
Refinement. The above secret distribution can be band-
width consuming (up to O(N2t) communication complex-
ity in total), which may be incompatible to the bandwidth-
hungry setting. To counter such a drawback, we deploy
Algorithm 1 to distribute the secret with communication
complexity O(Nt). Algorithm 1 is borrowed from [28], but
we allow each AV to share his secret to N − 1 counterparts
rather than a portion of them in the first step. Basically,
Algorithm 1 contains two steps: (i) N AVs individually
choose a degree-(t−1) univariate polynomial Vi(x) ∈ Zp[x],
where i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Then, each of them allocates shares of
Vi(0) to other N − 1 AVs. At the end of this step, each one
AVi obtains the share V (i) of V (x) =
∑N
i=1 Vi(x). V (i) is
defined as svi . (ii) Each AVi (i ∈ [N ]) generates another
degree-(t − 1) univariate polynomial Ai(x) ∈ Zp[x] and
Ai(0) = svi . Then, AVi redistributes secret shares of Ai(0) to
all AVs, that is, Ai(j) is distributed to AVj (j ∈ [N ]). In this
way, the foregoing N number of {Ai(x)}i∈[N ] with degree-
(t − 1) encode the bivariate polynomial F(x, y) ∈ Zp[x, y]
with degree-(t − 1, t − 1) and Fi(x, i) = Ai(x). Besides,
F(0, 0) = V (0) =
∑N
i=1 Vi(0). V (0) can be reconstructed
after collecting at least t shares V (j) (j ∈ [T ]). Similarly,
V (j) can be recovered by at least t shares Aj(q) (q ∈ [T ])
because of V (j) = Aj(0).
Algorithm 1: Each AV gets secret shares with commu-
nication complexity O(Nt)
Input: N AVs with identifier i ∈ [N ]
Output: Each AVi (i ∈ [N ]) possesses svi and {Aj(i)}
(j ∈ [N ])
1 Step 1.
2 for each AVi (i ∈ [N ]) do
3 choose a (t− 1)-degree Vi(x) ∈ Zp[x];
4 // keep Vi(0) secretly;
5 for each AVj (j ∈ [N ]) do
6 compute Vi(j) (mod Zp[x]);
7 // distribute Vi(j) (j 6= i) to AVj ;
8 // keep Vi(i) locally;
9 for i ∈ [N ] do
10 compute
∑N
j=1 Vj(i);
11 svi =
∑N
j=1 Vj(i);
12 Step 2.
13 for each AVi (i ∈ [N ]) do
14 generate a (t− 1)-degree Ai(x) ∈ Zp[x];
15 //where Ai(0) = svi ;
16 for each AVj (j ∈ [N ]) do
17 compute Ai(j) (mod Zp[x]);
18 // allocate Ai(j) (j 6= i) to AVj ;
Masking Phase. AVs mask intermediate gradients and
generate the corresponding authenticated MAC with the
masking secret and authenticated key. AVi first builds
PRG(Vi(0), round). Here, PRG is the pseudorandom gen-
erator agreed among AVs. After that, he computes c1,i =
(PRG(Vi(0), round) + wi) mod Zp to mask parameters,
6where wi is the element of wi. For each element, PRG uses
the distinct public nonce to generate random number.
To compute the second component, AVi generates a
common authenticated key s composed of si (i ∈ [N ]), i.e.,
s = (
∑N
i=1 si) mod Zp. Besides, AVi prepares ki = Vi(i)
since he possesses Vi(x). Based on s and ki = Vi(i), AVi
can compute c2,i = (
PRG(ki,round)−c1,i
s ) mod Zp. Then, AVs
send their masking results {i, (c1,i, c2,i)} (i ∈ [N ]) to BS.
Remark. It is worth noting that AVi’s ki can be recovered by
at least t AVs by providing Vi(l) (l 6= i & l ∈ [N ]).
Aggregation Phase. BS aggregates together the received
ciphertexts in this phase. BS receives AVs’ ciphertext and
records their identifier. If some AV’s ciphertext fails to
submit, BS will note his identifier in the returned result
because they have no contribution in this round. Suppose
that BS successfully receives M AVs’ ciphertext, M ≤ N .
BS separately aggregates two components of ciphertext:
c1 =
∑M
i=1 c1,i and c2 =
∑M
i=1 c2,i. Next, it returns the
aggregated result enclosing the failed AVs’ identifiers, that
is, {[N ] \ [M ], (c1, c2)}.
Verification Phase. Each AV verifies the correctness of
aggregated results returned by BS. Suppose that U (U ≥ t)
number of AVs receive results for keeping liveness [28].
They execute a distributed, unpredictable and unbiased
randomness algorithm [29] to select an AV leader to collect
shares from other AVs, and then recover secrets. In this
way, they collaboratively recover k =
∑M
i=1 ki which is
used to generate c2 =
∑M
i=1 c2,i in Masking phase. Recall
that at least t AVs can rebuild one of {ki}j∈[M ] and then k.
PRG(k, round) can be computed with k. Next, each of them
verifies the correctness of c1 and c2 by identifying whether
PRG(k, round) is equal to c2 · s+ c1. If yes, they go into the
next phase; otherwise, they reject the result.
Remark. Note that active AVs in this phase can privately
recover the secrets against outsiders and the edge node.
The fact is that each pair of AVs naturally share a common
secure key after the Setup phase, i.e., Fi(i, j) or Fj(j, i),
between AVi and AVj . With this common key, each of
them can securely transmit data by employing a symmetric
authenticated encryption algorithm. In doing so, there is no
need to additionally run a key-agreement protocol to share
a common key as done in work [17].
Decryption Phase. AVs collaboratively unmask the cor-
rect ciphertext. Specifically, AVs ∈ U further jointly recon-
struct F(0, 0) (also V (0)) which is used to mask the interme-
diate messages. Note that at least t AVs can collaboratively
obtain {Vi(0)}i∈[M ] and then V (0). PRG(V (0), round) can
be computed with V (0). After that, the aggregated message∑M
i=1 wi can be unmasked by c2−PRG(V (0), round). Then,
each of AVs use
∑M
i=1 wi to update the local parameters and
the next round begins.
Remark. In the case of link deterioration, we assume that
AVq (q /∈ [T ] but ∈ [U ]) loses her share. Her secret still can
be recovered only if there are at least t AVs ∈ [T ] in the
group. That is because t AVs are sufficient to rebuild AVq’s
share of F(0, 0). We emphatically explain it in the following
text.
Once an honest AV loses secret, saying V (q) (i.e. F(0, q)),
no less than t AVs who can provide shares Aq(j) (j ∈ [T ])
can help rebuild V (q). Here, we demonstrate the possible
Fig. 3: Case of AVs’ participation during a round. We
use seven squares to represent seven AVs and suppose
t = 3. The dotted lines with different colors dedicate the
participated AVs in respective phases, e.g., the green dotted
lines appoint the three AVs (in green squares) participating
in Setup phase, which means they have received shares.
Note that AVs’ identifiers belong to the corresponding sets
mentioned in Fig. 2.
occurrence of the case of AVs’ shares missing with the help
of Fig. 3. Obviously, there are four AVs (due to four squares)
contributing in Aggregation phase and they have to verify
and decrypt the returned ciphertext in Verification phase
and Decrypt phase, respectively. However, two AVs (in the
blue squares) have no shares, since they do not participate
in Setup phase due to asynchronous communication. Then,
they need help from other three AVs (in the green squares)
to reconstruct their shares. In addition, the remain AVs (in
the white squares) are not permitted to obtain the returned
result since they do not make their contributions in Aggre-
gation phase.
4.2 Alternative Design
For not rerunning the Setup phase, this section seeks
to introduce an alternative design making shared secrets
reusable in a secure manner.
The main idea is that each AV distributes encrypted
shares to other AVs, where each share to some AV is
encrypted under the public key of this AV, and meanwhile
the respective secret is recovered without leaking any
information of shares. Here, we denote a pair of private
and public key for AVi, i.e., (ski, Gski ), where G is a public
parameter and a generator in a multiplicatively cyclic group
G. We assume that they are secretly generated and public
to all AVs. Then, the modified workflows for each step are
shown as follows.
Setup phase. AVi allocates share GskjVi(j) and GskjAi(j)
to AVj (instead of Vi(j) and Ai(j) in Algorithm 1), which
only occurs at the first round. However, authenticated key
si still needs to be freshly chosen and sent at each round,
which leads to comparatively negligible cost. In this case,
secret GVi(0) can be later reconstructed with at least t shares
GVi(q) provided by AVq who knows private key skq (q ∈
[T ]). Similarly, secret GAi(0) can be reconstructed by at least
t shares GAi(q) (q ∈ [T ]).
Masking phase. AVi generates masking results
{i, (Gc1,i , Gc2,i)}. Note that this phase uses fresh key s =∑N
i=1 si (mod Zp) each round.
7Aggregation phase. c1 is computed by
∏M
i=1 c1,i and
c2 =
∏M
i=1 c2,i.
Verification phase. AVs verify whether cs2 · c1 is equal to
G
∑M
i=1 PRG(ki,round), where [M ] AVs provide GPRG(ki,round).
Decryption phase. G
∑M
i=1 wi can be computed by c2 ·
1/GPRG(V (0),round) due to {GPRG(Vi(0),round)}i∈[M ] can be
recovered and then GPRG(V (0),round) can be calculated.
Here, PRG needs to satisfy the following properties. It
satisfies PRG(key1 + key2, round) = PRG(key1, round) +
PRG(key2, round) and cst · PRG(key, round) = PRG(cst ·
key, round), where cst is a constant [30]. Finally,
∑M
i=1 wi
can be obtained by using the Baby-Step-Giant-Step (BSGS)
algorithm which can be realized with a reasonable cost for
any integer no larger than 32 bits [31].
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we give the security analysis with respect
to the security goals mentioned in Section 3.3. Recall that
SecEL devotes to protect data privacy, guarantee compu-
tation integrity and ensure reliability. However, whether
these issues can be addressed depends on if the primitive
of the symmetric bivariate polynomial is secure enough.
Therefore, we first give the analysis that symmetric bivariate
polynomial we used is secure (Theorem 1), and then we
present the security analysis for the foregoing security goals.
Theorem 1. Symmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y) is a (t,N)
secure secret sharing scheme.
Proof. It needs to be satisfied that only t ≤ N participants
can reconstruct the secret, thus we prove less than t number
of participants are unable to gain the secret.
Note that the selected F(x, y) has total t+ t(t−1)2 coefficients.
Suppose that there exist t − 1 participants colluding. i has
two (t − 1)-degree univariate polynomials {F(x, i), F(i, y)}
(note: F(j, i) = F (i, j)) and can build t linear independent
equations. Then, t−1 colluded participants totally gain t(t−
1) linear independent equations. At the same time, those
t− 1 colluded participants, with each other, share (t−1)(t−2)2
points of the bivariate polynomial F(x, y). Thus, they finally
can build t(t− 1)− (t−1)(t−2)2 linear independent equations
at total to solve the bivariate polynomial F(x, y). Since t +
t(t−1)
2 is larger than t(t − 1) − (t−1)(t−2)2 , t − 1 colluded
participants cannot reconstruct F(x, y) and gain the secret.
Protecting data privacy. Recall that SecEL uses the se-
cret hidden in the symmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y)
to mask the sharing parameters by one-time padding. In
this way, the confidentiality of the sharing parameters is
ensured, and then the privacy of corresponding data is
protected. Formally, we define the method in SecEL to mask
parameters is semantically secure as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If PRG is a secure pseudo-random function (PRF),
SecEL is semantically secure according to the Definition 1 as
shown in the work [25]
Analysis. Refer it to the work [25]’s Definition 1 which
defines the security model of one-time padding by games
between challenger and adversary. We obtain the follow-
ing conclusion: the probability that an adversary correctly
guesses a masking parameter Prm is less than the prob-
ability Prprg to successfully distinguish PRG and a truly
random function plus 12 , i.e., Prm ≤ Prprg + 12 .
Guaranteeing computation integrity. Recall that SecEL
uses homomorphic authenticator to generate homomorphic
message authentication codes for each AV’s masking pa-
rameters, thereby the computation integrity is guaranteed.
Formally, we define the method to generate authentication
code is unforgeable as depicted in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. If PRG is a secure pseudo-random function (PRF),
SecEL is unforgeable according to the work [25]’s Definition 2.
Analysis. Refer it to the work [25]’s Definition 2 which
defines the security model of generating authenticated code
by games between challenger and adversary. We draw the
conclusion: the probability Prforge that an adversary suc-
cessfully forges a correct authenticated code is less than
the probability Prprg plus the negligible probability for
the adversary to make verification queries, i.e., Prforge ≤
Prprg + neg(λ). Herein, λ is the security parameter.
Ensuring reliability. Recall that reliability is referred to
allowing for honest AVs correctly decrypting the aggregated
parameters only if they have contributions. Refer to the De-
cryption phase in Section 4, we demonstrate how an honest
but failed AV’s secret shares can be recovered. Particularly,
the AV makes his contribution in Aggregation phase but
loses his secret shares due to the failed connection in Setup
phase. Let t alive AVs help the honest but failed AV to obtain
his shares. Then the AV fluently decrypts the aggregated
result, thereby avoiding hindering his local training process,
which ensures reliability.
6 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we simulate and evaluate the presented
SecEL. We apply it into a popular image classification task.
Extensive experiments are performed to validate the feasi-
bility and effectiveness of SecEL.
6.1 Simulation Environment
We simulate SecEL as a module using Python programming
language (version 3.6.4) and PyCryptodome library (version
3.6.1), about 200-line codes at total. The module covers five
phases presented in Section 4. Note that the length of ran-
domly selected secret is 128 bits and p is a randomly chosen
130 bit prime. On the other hand, we build the learning
model on the MNIST dataset, which is implemented by
Python as well, Numpy (version 1.14.0) and Tensorflow
(version 1.7.0). The learning model is collaboratively trained
by multiple parties via sharing individual model parameters
(also called as gradients). Herein, the party refers to the
role of AV. Particularly, MNIST dataset is split equally and
distributed to individual parties before learning. Individual
parties train a common learning model based on the indi-
vidual dataset. At the same time, they share model parame-
ters obtained from their local models. Shared parameters are
masked by calling the mask function of the SecEL module.
Those masked parameters then are aggregated by calling
SecEL’s aggregate function. With verify and decrypt functions,
the aggregated result can be verified and decrypted. In
8addition, all of the experiments are conducted on a desktop
computer with 2.70 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU and 8 GB
memory.
6.2 Performance Analysis
According to the detailed design demonstrated in Section 4,
we give the performance analysis for SecEL in each round,
in terms of computation and communication overhead.
6.2.1 Computation overhead
First, for each AV, there hasO(Nt+l+N+Ntl) computation
time cost at total, where l is the length of w. In detail, this
total cost can be broken up into the following parts: (i) In
Setup phase, each AV needs to share secret to other AV by
using Algorithm 1, which leads to time cost O(N(t − 1));
(ii) In Masking phase, each of them masks parameters by
the encryption method of one-time padding, which results
in time cost O(l); (iii) In Verification phase, each active AV
collaborates with others to recover the authenticated key
and then verifies the returned result, which has time cost
O(Nl); (iv) In Decryption phase, each active AV needs to
rebuild the masking secret and unmask the returned cipher-
text with time costO(Ntl). Second, for the edge node, it has
time costO(Nl), since it needs to aggregate parameters sent
by participating AVs.
TABLE 2: Performance analysis on computation overhead
Setup Masking Aggregation Verification Decryption
Each
AV
O(N(t− 1)) O(l) - - O(Nl) O(Ntl)
Edge
node
- - - - O(Nl) - - - -
6.2.2 Communication overhead
First, AVs have two kinds of communication cost depending
on whether being the leader or not in Verification and De-
cryption phase. Recall that we use a randomness algorithm
to select a leader among active AVs to help recovering secret,
which takes O(c2N) communication cost according to the
latest work [29]; if c is far smaller that N , it would lead to
O(N). Next, we analyse the communication cost for the AV
being leader and the AV not being leader. On one hand, the
AV being leader has O(Nt + l + Nl + c2N + N2 + N2)
cost, reduced toO(Nl+N2). On the other hand, the AV not
being leader has O(Nt+ l +Nl + c2N +N +N), reduced
to O(Nt + Nl). Second, for the edge node, it takes O(Nl)
when receiving the masking parameters from N AVs.
TABLE 3: Performance analysis on communication over-
head
Setup Masking Aggregation Verification Decryption
Each
AV
O(Nt) O(l) O(Nl) O(c2N+
N2)
O(N2)
or
O(N)
or O(N)
Edge
node
- - - - O(Nl) - - - -
6.3 Evaluation
We first conduct the experiments to evaluate SecEL’s per-
formance from the aspects of time cost and throughput.
Time cost is an essentially crucial metric in the setting of
AVNET that indicates processing latency. Throughput also
is an important factor to demonstrate the consumption of
bandwidth resource. We evaluate the time cost of each phase
respectively and throughput in Masking and Aggregation
phase.
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Fig. 5: Impact of No. of gradients on time cost and through-
put in Masking phase.
Fig. 4 shows the time consumption in Setup phase with
the increasing number of parties. It is worth noting that the
consumed time is independent of the size of learning model,
i.e., the number of gradients in the following text. When
the number of parties is less than 400, it will take no more
than 20 s. Especially, the time cost for 100 parties is actually
3.638106206 s.
Fig. 5a shows the time cost in Masking phase as the
number of gradients grows up. It can be observed that the
time cost increases linearly with the number of gradients.
However, it is irrelative to the number of parties, since each
party masks gradients individually. On the other hand, the
trend of throughput appears to be slightly downward as
depicted in Fig. 5b.
Fig. 6a illustrates the time consumption in Aggregation
phase, which depends on the quantity of gradients and
parties. It can be observed that as the number of gradients
increases, it becomes more time consuming when a group
with the same number of parties performs in Aggregation
phase. On the other hand, Fig. 6b presents that throughput
has a decreased tread with more parties participating in.
It can be observed from Fig. 7a that the number of
parties makes insignificant impact on the time consumed in
9Verification phase, but the rising number of gradients leads
to the linearly increasing time consumption. It is reasonable
that the figure of parties is far less than that of gradients
and more aggregated gradients take more time to verify.
Finally, it can be observed from Fig. 7b that the Decryption
phase is more time consuming when compared with other
phases due to the overhead of reconstructing masking keys.
As demonstrated, the used time grows up on two hands,
i.e., the rising number of gradients and parties.
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Fig. 6: Impact of No. of gradients and No. of parties on time
cost and throughput in Aggregation phase.
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Fig. 7: Impact of No. of gradients and No. of parties on time
cost in Verification phase and Decryption phase.
After showing each phase’s time-cost performance of
SecEL, we following demonstrate the impact of different
proportions of drop-off parties f on classification accuracy,
when the total number of parties is 100. In detail, we
randomly select f = 124 ,
1
12 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 of 100 parties failing
to share their parameters in each global aggregation step
when training. Fig. 8 gives the experiment results, where
the classification accuracy sightly decreases as the figure of
drop-off parties grows up.
Proportion of dropoff parties
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Tr
an
in
g 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.33
Fig. 8: Impact of dropoff parties on classification accuracy.
After showing the time-cost performance of SecEL, we
following demonstrate the accuracy results of the classifica-
tion task in the cases of different number of participating
parties with f = t − 1 parties dropoff. Specifically, we
randomly select f parties failing to share their parameters
in each global aggregation step, in which f equals to 13 of
the total participating parties.
7 RELATED WORK
TABLE 4: Comparison of our work and the existing work
Ours [17] [13] [14]
Encryption method one-
time
padding
one-time
padding
asymmetric
encryption
asymmetric
encryption
Data privacy
√ √ √ √
Verifiable computa-
tion
√ × × √
Lost secret recovery
√ × × ×
1 √ means having the corresponding security property while × means not
having.
Recently, there is a wide and hot discussion on edge
learning. Some works study the performance of edge learn-
ing, e.g., accuracy and efficiency. For example, Wang et al. [3]
focus on the convergence rate of the gradient-descent based
distributed learning algorithms in resource-limited MEC
systems. The authors present an effective control algorithm
after analyzing the trade-off relationship among the number
of global aggregation, the classification accuracy and re-
source cost. Specifically, the control algorithm is to make the
best use of given amount of resources to learn by balancing
well the number of local update and global aggregation.
Also, Zhu et al. [6] research on the communication latency
issue of distributed learning in MEC settings and propose
the novel concept of learning-driven communication. In a
word, the foregoing work can be regarded as the comple-
mentary parts to this paper.
On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge,
there still have few papers discussing security issues of
edge learning. Although there exists a portion of work on
privacy-preserving distributed learning, they could not be
directly immigrated into the MEC systems, where com-
munication is asynchronous and resources are limited. We
compare these works in Table 4, which demonstrates SecEL
simultaneously achieves three security goals. First of all,
Shokri et al. [32] implement a privacy-preserving distributed
deep learning system, where multiple parties share a small
fraction of gradients and learn a deep learning model to-
gether. Their system uses the difference privacy technique
to add noise into shared parameters, so that data privacy
is guaranteed to a certain degree. However, their proposed
system has been attacked by Hitaj et al. [11] by employ-
ing the tool of GAN (Generative Adversarial Network).
Bonawitz et al. [17] preserve Shokri et al.‘s system model
of training and proposes an efficient method to securely
aggregate local gradients of participants for a common
deep learning model. However, the presented scheme is
deployed in the synchronous communication environment
and could not help a fraction of link-failed participants to
recover their lost secrets. Most unfortunately, the scheme
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does not support participants to verify the correctness of
computation in a server (the server is the edge node in our
paper). As for data privacy, Bonawitz et al.’s scheme allows
the server to obtain the unmasking aggregated result, while
our work does not do that. In SecEL, the masking aggre-
gated result is returned by the edge node and unmasked
by participating AVs. Other works on privacy-preserving
distributed learning, such as [13], [14], utilize public key-
based cryptographic systems to protect data privacy, which
takes more computation than the encryption method of one-
time padding.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving, verifiable
and fault-tolerant scheme, named SecEL for edge learning
in AVNET. Specifically, SecEL combines the primitive bi-
variate polynomial-based secret sharing with homomorphic
authenticator. Participating AVs’ sharing parameters are
protected by the way of one-time padding and labeled with
respective MACs, thus data privacy and verifiable compu-
tation are ensured. In addition, SecEL allows an honest but
failed participating AV’s secret can be rebuilt by other active
participants, which is adapted to the asynchronous AVNET
environment. Finally, the evaluation of SecEL demonstrates
the acceptable performance results.
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